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Abstract A recent no-go theorem [10] establishes a contradiction from a specific
application of quantum theory to a multi-agent setting. The proof of this theorem
relies heavily on notions such as ‘knows’ or ‘is certain that’. This has stimulated an
analysis of the theorem by Nurgalieva and del Rio [23], in which they claim that it
shows the “[i]nadequacy of modal logic in quantum settings” (ibid.). In this paper,
we will offer a significantly extended and refined reconstruction of the theorem in
multi-agent modal logic. We will then show that a thorough reconstruction of the
proof as given by Frauchiger and Renner requires the reflexivity of access relations
(system T). However, a stronger theorem is possible that already follows in serial
frames, and hence also holds in systems of doxastic logic (such as KD45). After
proving this, we will discuss the general implications for different interpretations of
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1 Introduction
Quantum theory (QT) is the most successful theory of modern science [e.g. 18],
and yet notoriously defies even a more-or-less agreed-upon interpretation. In the
mathematical formalism, to recall, a system’s state is modelled by a density operator
ρ, a positive trace class operator with trace 1 on some separable Hilbert space H ,
i.e., 〈v |ρ|v〉 = 〈v |ρv〉 ≥ 0 for all |v〉 ∈ H , where 〈·|·〉 defines a Hermitian form on
H , and tr(ρ) =d f ∑di=1 〈vi |ρ|vi〉 = 1 ({|vi〉}1≤i≤d an orthonormal basis of H , and
dimH = d ∈ R ∪ {∞}).
In case ρ corresponds to a projector piv = |v〉〈v |, it is called pure and in turn
corresponds to an equivalence class of vectors |v〉 from H with |v〉 ∼ |v〉′ iff (if,
and only if) there is a φ ∈ R s.t. |v′〉 = eıφ |v〉 (ı = √−1). piv is positive and satisfies
piv = pi
†
v and pi2v = piv , where the adjoint X† is defined by 〈v |X†v′〉 = 〈Xv |v′〉 ( |Yv〉
the vector resulting from applying operator Y to |v〉 and 〈v | an element of the dual
space H ∗ of H ). Non-pure states, also called mixed, are convex sums ρ = ∑k λkpik ,
where the λk ≥ 0 satisfy ∑k λk = 1 and can be interpreted as probabilities.
According to the Schödinger picture, the state of the system evolves as UρU†,
were U is a bijective, linear, norm-preserving (unitary) map on H that depends on a
time-parameter t, and UU† = U†U gives the identity map I onH . (For N spacesHj ,
we let IN the identity on
⊗N
j=1Hj .) The simplest kind of measurement on a system s
with state ρs is given by a family of one dimensional orthogonal projectors
{
pij
}
1≤ j≤d ,
each corresponding to a one dimensional subspace ofH , where orthogonality means
piipij = δi jI (δi j the Kronecker symbol). Equivalently, the Heisenberg picture has the
pij evolve over time as pitj = U
†
t pijUt .
According to Born’s rule, the probability for obtaining outcome o in a correspond-
ing measurement on s is given by tr(ρpio), which simplifies to 〈v |pio |v〉 = 〈v |o〉 〈o|v〉
for a pure state (ρ = |v〉〈v |). One may define an observable O whose values corre-
spond to these outcomes either directly by the set of projectors or by O =
∑
o opio.
The set σ(O) of values o ofO is also calledO’s eigenvalue-spectrum, and Born’s rule
defines a probability measure Pr(O = o) = tr(ρpio) over σ(O).
Measurements of this kind are called projective, and if one particular outcome
results, they are additionally called selective. The state update-prescription for this
kind of measurement, called the Lüdes rule, has ρ evolve as
ρ 7→ pioρpio/tr(ρpio), (1)
where pio corresponds to the value o of O measured.
On account of the evolution described in (1), the state of the system measured will
become pio, which corresponds to the eigenstate |o〉 of O, meaning that it satisfies
O |o〉 = o |o〉. However, even assuming ρ to be pure (ρ = |v〉〈v |), it could have a
(non-trivial) expansion |v〉 = ∑o αo |o〉 in terms of O’s eigenstates, where αo ∈ C for
each o.
TheLüders step piv 7→ pio is thus generally incompatiblewith the unitary evolution:
Assuming |ψ〉s = |o〉s for some system system s being measured, the joint evolution
of s and measuring devicem should, in the simplest case called an ideal von Neumann
measurement, proceed asU |o〉s |0〉m = |o〉s |o〉m, where |0〉m is some state in which
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m does not indicate anything particular about s’s state, and |o〉m one where it indicates
s’s state exactly. However, if the state of s is |v〉s =
∑
o αo |o〉s , the same unitary will
effect the change U
∑
i αi |o〉s |0〉m =
∑
o αo |o〉s |o〉m. The incompatibility between
these two kinds of processes is known as the quantum measurement problem [e.g.
19].
The implications of the measurement problem are far reaching and well-known, in
part on account of thought experiments such as that ofWigner’s friend [30]: Assume
that a friend f of physicist EugeneWigner ismeasuring an observable of some quantum
system s inside the confines of some laboratory. f then finds outcome o and assigns
state ρ = pio accordingly. Now assume also that Wigner is outside the laboratory and
wants to find out the joint state of f and s by making an appropriate measurement. In a
sense, the friend is a physical system: organisms consist of molecules, which consist
of atoms, which consist of elementary particles. Hence, the joint system sf could be
associated with a however complex density operator ρsf that evolves unitarily in time.
From Wigner’s point of view, neither should s therefore be in a state pio at the
time the friend chose to measure it, nor should f himself be in an eigenstate of most of
the observables Wigner could in principle measure on him. To avoid the conclusion
that f would hence end up “in a state of suspended animation”, Wigner attributed
to “consciousness[...] a different role in quantum mechanics than [to] the inanimate
measuring device[...].” [30, 293]
Recently, Frauchiger and Renner [10] have extended the scenario of Wigner’s
friend, the result being a theorem that purports to demonstrate the inconsistency of
single outcome interpretations of QT in which it can be universally applied. The
scenario concerns “multiple agents” that each “have access to different pieces of
information, and draw conclusions by reasoning about the information held by others”
[10, 6], so it falls in the domain of quantum information theory, “the study of the
information processing tasks [...] accomplished using quantum mechanical systems.”
[21, 1] Reasoning about information in multi-agent scenarios is also the proper subject
of epistemic logic [e.g. 29, 1]. Hence, it should be possible to reconstruct the theorem
within epistemic logic—as has been done by Nurgalieva and del Rio [23].
We here significantly extend and refine Nurgalieva and del Rio’s approach to
better understand the consequences of Frauchiger and Renner’s theorem. We will also
show that the theorem follows in epistemic as well as doxastic systems, and discuss
implications and options for dealing with them.
2 Intuitive approach
Frauchiger and Renner [10, 2] consider the following experimental protocol, involving
four agents – call them Amanda (a), Chris (c), David (d), and Gustavo (g) – and two
qbits (two-state quantum systems) r, l:
FR-Protocol:
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t = 0: The initial state of r is |init〉r =
√
1/3 |0〉r +
√
2/3 |1〉r , and that of l
is |0〉l . The memories of a, c, d, g are each associated with quantum states
|0〉 j ( j ∈ {a, c, d, g}).
t = 1: a performs ameasurement {pi0, pi1} on r and hermemory is updated to |0〉a
or |1〉a respectively, depending on the result. If she measures 0, she leaves l
in its initial state; otherwise she prepares it in state |+〉l =
√
1/2( |0〉l + |1〉l)
by an appropriate procedure. Afterwards, she sends it to g in each case.
t = 2: g performs a measurement {pi0, pi1} on l and his memory is updated
accordingly.
t = 3: c performs a joint measurement {piok, pifail} on r and a’s memory, where
|ok〉ra =
√
1/2( |0〉r |0〉a − |1〉r |1〉a),
|fail〉ra =
√
1/2( |0〉r |0〉a + |1〉r |1〉a),
and his memory is updated accordingly.
t = 4: d performs a joint measurement {piok, pifail} on l and g’s memory, where
|ok〉lg =
√
1/2( |0〉l |0〉g − |1〉l |1〉g),
|fail〉lg =
√
1/2( |0〉l |0〉g + |1〉l |1〉g),
and his memory is updated accordingly.
t = 5: c and d compare their outcomes and halt the experiment if they both have
measured ‘ok’ on their respective system. Otherwise they set t = 0 and the
protocol repeats.
The unitaries relevant for the physical processes involved in the FR-Protocol are
given in the Appendix, A 1. Allowing that agents can treat other agents as physical
systems and describe their co-evolution with other systems unitarily, one obtains
(
√
1/3 |0〉r |0〉a |0〉l +
√
2/3 |1〉r |1〉a
√
1/2( |0〉l + |1〉l)) |0〉g
=(
√
1/3( |0〉r |0〉a + |1〉r |1〉a) |0〉l +
√
1/3 |1〉r |1〉a |1〉l) |0〉g
=(
√
2/3 |fail〉ra |0〉l +
√
1/3 |1〉r |1〉a |1〉l) |0〉g
at t ′ > t1 > 1, where tj generically refers to the time in interval ( j, j + 1] at which the
given measurement is completed and t ′ denotes the time when Amanda has finished
her subsequent preparation on l.1 Similarly, after t2, the total state will be√
2/3 |fail〉ra |0〉l |0〉g +
√
1/3 |1〉r |1〉a |1〉l |1〉g (2)
=
√
1/3 |0〉r |0〉a |0〉l |0〉g +
√
2/3 |1〉r |1〉a |fail〉lg =: |Ψ〉ralg . (3)
1 We consider all measurement ‘pointlike’ and time t′ of Amanda’s preparation to be ‘just after’ her
measurement.
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By Born’s rule,
Pr
(
M t3c = ok ∧ M t4d = ok
)
= ralg〈Ψ| piok ⊗ piok |Ψ〉ralg = 1/12,
so QT renders it expected that the experiment may come to a halt at some point.
Assuming that this has happened, what could David infer from QT?
To see how his conclusion leads to a conflict, consider the following reasoning
principles invoked by [10, 4–5]:
Q Suppose agent x has established: (i) System s is in state |v〉s at t0. Suppose
furthermore that x knows: (ii) A value for O is obtained by a measurement of
the projectors
{
pit0o
}
o∈σ(O) on s at t0, completed at t. If s 〈v |pit0o˜ |v〉s = 1 for some
o˜ ∈ σ(O), then x can conclude: (iii) I am certain that O = o˜ at t.
C Suppose agent x has established: (i) I am certain that agent y, upon reasoning with
the same theory as I, is certain that O = o˜ at t. Then x can conclude: (ii) I am
certain that O = o˜ at t.
S Suppose agent x has established: (i) I am certain that O = o˜ at t. Then x must
deny: (ii) I am certain that O , o˜ at t.
S may be understood as expressing a ‘single world’ view of QT, as in a many
worlds-view, O may be regarded as simultaneously taking on multiple, non-identical
values, confined (after decoherence) tomore or less independent ‘worlds’ or ‘branches’.
Q establishes a semantic link between quantum probabilities and value statements that
may be regarded certain. C, finally, means a removal of iterations of ‘certainty’, re-
gardless of whose agent’s certainties they are.
Finally, it is an additional assumption [cf. 23, 272] that observables defined over
joint spaces can be evolved unitarily:2
U Suppose agent x has established: (i) System s , x is in state |v〉s at time t0. Suppose
furthermore that x knows: (ii) A value for O is obtained by a measurement of the
projectors {pio}o∈σ(O) on s at t1 > t0. Then there is a unitary operatorU that x can
use to establish s 〈v |pit1o˜ |v〉s = s 〈v |U†pio˜U |v〉s .
Note the stipulation s , x. If this was absent, a contradiction would follow trivially,
as Amanda could model her own state in contradictory ways.
Suppose now that Amanda is interested Gustavo’s lab and has measured value 1
at t1 (M t1a = 1) and prepared system l in |+〉l at t ′ > t1 accordingly. Using U, she can
establish the joint state |fail〉lg at t2. Then, using her background knowledge of the
experimental setup as well as the fact that lg〈fail| pifail |fail〉lg = 1, she can infer from
Q:
α ‘I am certain that M t4
d
= fail.’
Assume also that GustavomeasuresM t2g = 1. UsingQ, Gustavomay reason as follows:
had the state of the qbit he received been |0〉l , he could have been certain thatM t1g = 0,
as l 〈0|pi0 |0〉l = 1. So the state must have been |+〉l . Gustavo knows that Amanda has
prepared the state accordingly, so he can reconstruct her reasoning by appeal to QT
to conclude:
2 Frauchiger and Renner appeal to isometries, linear and norm-preserving but not necessarily bijective
maps. Like Nurgalieva and del Rio, however, we assume unitary extensions without loss of generality.
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γ˜ ‘I am certain that a is certain that M t4
d
= fail.’
Or, using C:
γ ‘I am certain that M t4
d
= fail.’
Consider now the operator
Π¬(okc∧0g) := I4 − Πt3okΠt20 ,
where
Πt20 = U
†(I2 ⊗ pi0 ⊗ I)U, Πt3ok = U¯†(piok ⊗ I2)U¯. (4)
Here, U = Ut′Ut1 evolves operators until t = 2 and U¯ = Ut2U until t = 3, with the Ui
as given in the Appendix, A 1. As shown there, this yields
ralg〈init| Π¬(okc∧0g) |init〉ralg = 1 − ralg〈init| Πt3okΠt20 |init〉ralg = 1 − 0 = 1, (5)
with |init〉ralg := |init〉r
⊗
j=a,l,g |0〉 j .
Using Q and U, Chris can hence be certain that M t3c , ok ∨M t2g , 0. However,
M t3c = ok, so under the assumption that M
t2
g = 0, Chris could be certain that ¬(M t3c ,
ok ∨M t2g , 0) which contradicts S. Hence Chris can infer M t2g = 1. Building on this,
he can reconstruct Gustavo’s reasoning to arrive at:
χ ‘I am certain that M t4
d
= fail.’
Finally, Chris tells David his result. Following through Chris’ chain of reasoning,
David can infer that Gustavomust have received |+〉l andAmandamust havemeasured
1 at t1. From (3) we read off that David can then also infer:
δ ‘I am certain that M t4
d
= fail.”
However, indeed M t4
d
= ok, and David is certain of that. Hence, by S, David can and
cannot be certain that M t4
d
= ok. Contradiction.
3 Probabilistic certainty and systems of epistemic and doxastic logic
The above proof had a crucial reliance on notions such as ‘is certain’ or ‘knows’, and
the exact lines of reasoning by appeal to these notions are, in some instances, not
perfectly clear. The rules for reasoning about such notions are the subject matter of
epistemic logic, as has been noted by Nurgalieva and del Rio, leading them to claim
the “[i]nadequacy of modal logic in quantum settings”.
This is a bold claim. However, it seems plausible that the above argument does
constitute a puzzlewhen reconstructedwithin a suitablemodal system.What, however,
is the puzzle exactly and what are possible solutions?
Let us first recall some fundamentals. Let L a propositional language over a set
of elementary propositions p, q, . . ., subject to the usual recursive rules for ∨,∧,¬.
‘⊃’ denotes material implication and is defined as ¬ϕ ∨ ψ; ‘≡’ denotes material
equivalence and is defined as (ϕ ⊃ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⊃ ϕ). Adding for each agent x from some
set A a modal operator x and defining ♦xϕ ≡d f ¬x¬ϕ for each x, one obtains an
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enriched language L in which for every well-formed formula ϕ from L xϕ is
well-formed as well.
A frame is an ordered pair FA = 〈W, R〉, where R : A→ P(W2) yields a binary
relation Rx ⊆ W ×W overW for every x ∈ A. Intuitively, wRxw′ specifies the worlds
w′ that are in some sense epistemically possible for x w.r.t. w, so that the operators
may “unpack the account of knowledge encoded in the frame by R.” [32, 974]. So
wRxw′ means that x holds it possible that she is in w′ if she is in w. The converse
might not be true, i.e., Rx need not be assumed symmetric.
A model is an ordered pair MP = 〈FA,V〉 defined some set P of elementary
propositions, where V : P→ P(W) is a valuation function that associates with every
proposition p ∈ P the worlds w ∈ W in which it is true. (We will suppress indices A
and P for simplicity below.)
Finally, a pointed model may be defined as a pair Mˆ = 〈M, wˆ〉, where wˆ ∈ W . In
epistemic logic(s), truth of formulas ξ may then be defined w.r.t. a pointed model Mˆ
as follows:
Mˆ |= p iff wˆ ∈ V(p),
Mˆ |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff Mˆ |= ϕ and Mˆ |= ψ,
Mˆ |= ¬ϕ iff Mˆ 6|= ϕ,
Mˆ |= xϕ iff for all w s.t. wˆRxw, 〈M,w〉 |= ϕ.
We may think of wˆ as the actual world, w.r.t which the epistemic conditions of x
are evaluated. If some formula ϕ holds in all pointed versions 〈M,w〉 ofM, we may
writeM |= ϕ.
As is well known, there are different axiom systems which allow to assign different
meanings to the operators x and ♦x. The weakest system is K,3 defined, w.r.t. all
agents x in some set A, by the following axiom schemata and transformation rules:
PC If ϕ is a propositional tautology, then ϕ is a theorem.
K x(ϕ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (xϕ ⊃ xψ).
MP From ϕ and ϕ ⊃ ψ, infer ψ.
N From ϕ infer xϕ.
The propositional tautologies in PC may include modal operators, as long as they
are valid in virtue of their propositional form (as in xp ∨ ¬xp). Moreover, the
‘necessitation rule’, N, must be treated with caution: it only be applies to theorems,
not to premises or assumptions, for otherwise it produces contradictions and other
undesirable results [e.g. 29, 29].
While K is “a minimal modal logic”, as it “happens to capture the validities
of the [...] class of all Kripke models” [29, 26; orig. emph.], it is known to be
problematic when xϕ is interpreted as ‘x knows that ϕ’. N, for instance, expresses
logical omniscience: any propositional tautology, regardless of its complexity, is
known by all of the agents in the set A. Similarly, K, together with MP, delivers the
closure of knowledge under known implication; a principle long suspected to be at
the heart of arguments for radical skepticism [22].
3 Actually one obtains a system Kn for |A | = n, not identical to K with only one primitive modal
operator for n > 1. The same holds for all systems discussed below; but we generally omit the index and
allow loose talk of ‘system X’ instead of Xn .
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Similar considerations apply to Bayesian approaches to probability though: Ap-
plying the Kolmogorov axioms as a formal model of agents’ beliefs requires logical
omniscience. This has not impaired the popularity of Bayesianism in present-day
philosophy. Typically, such considerations are dealt with in terms of idealization,
meaning that Bayesian probability models are understood as idealized (normative)
models of perfectly rational, logically omniscient agents. The same is true about epis-
temic logic: It’s use is to investigate “idealised notions of knowledge, that do not
necessarily hold for human beings.” [29, ibid.; orig. emph.]
The following three additional axioms are typically considered in epistemic logic:
T xϕ ⊃ ϕ.
4 xϕ ⊃ xxϕ.
5 ¬xϕ ⊃ x¬xϕ.
K+T+4+5 is the system S5. With appropriate interpretation of the operators x, the
axioms of S5 are sometimes referred to as the ‘axioms of knowledge’ [29, 23]. It
requires the accessibility relation to be an equivalence relation, in the sense that any
formula that is valid in a frame F wherein every Rx is an equivalence relation is a
theorem of S5 [6, 61]. To recall, Rx is an equivalence relation overW(3 w,w′,w′′) if
it is reflexive: wRxw; transitive: if wRxw′ and w′Rxw′′, then wRxw′′; and symmetric:
wRxw′ iff w′Rxw.
Axiom T establishes knowledge as a factive notion: whatever is known must be
true. This excludes, e.g., usage of ‘knowledge’ wherein a set of background beliefs
merely taken to be established as true is meant [14, 307]. T therefore delineates the
appropriate target of epistemic logic as the (narrower) concept that epistemologists
typically aim to explicate.
Axioms 4 and 5 are less innocent: 4 is the KK-principle, that one knows what
one knows, not respected by externalist theories of knowledge. 5 is a corresponding
negative version that could be questioned on the same grounds. Hence S5 deals with
an idealized internalist conception of knowledge.
These complications are avoided if one assumes what is “usually considered to be
[...] the weakest system of epistemic interest” [17, Sect. 1], namely T, which is K+T.
T is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of all reflexive frames [cf. 29, 28], where
a frame F is said to be reflexive if R yields a reflexive accessibility relation for all
x ∈ A. (We may equally call (pointed) models reflexive etc. below.)
We have seen that Frauchiger and Renner sometimes talk about agents’ knowledge,
sometimes about their being certain. In the latter case, we may interpret probability-
1 assertions, as they arise from the quantum calculus, as expressions of maximal
credences, rather than of knowledge. Indeed, there are several reasons for considering
quantum probabilities, even those equal to unity, expressions of subjective credences
rather than unequivocal indicators of objective events [e.g. 5].
Now knowledge may be factive, but certainty is generally not. It is perfectly
coherent to say: ‘I was absolutely certain that ϕ, but it was wrong nevertheless’. Yet
Gustavo inferred that he could be certain of an event in case Amanda was certain of it,
which is erroneous if Amanda is mistaken. Hence, if we take Frauchiger and Renner’s
appeals to certainty seriously, the theorem might be blocked.
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Therefore, let us consider also system KD45, usually regarded as an appropriate
logic for belief or certainty ([29, 39]; [14]), which results from S5 when T is replaced
by:
D xϕ ⊃ ♦xϕ
In KD45,xϕ is understood as ‘x is certain that ϕ’, and D essentially tells us that what
is firmly believed by x is not regarded impossible by her. Note also that, while each
Rx is required to be reflexive in T, the validities of KD45 are captured by frames that
are serial: for all w ∈ W there is a w′ such that wRxw′; transitive; and Euclidean: for
all w,w′,w′′ ∈ W , if wRxw′ and wRxw′′ then w′Rxw′′. Seriality hence means that
something is conceivable for every agent from every world, transitivity that what is
conceivable for an agent from one world will also be conceivable for her from worlds
from which this world is conceivable, and Eucildeanness that two conceivable worlds
are mutually conceivable.
Locutions of knowledge and certainty were directly connected to probability-1
claims in the proof, so we also need to establish a link between the two. Indeed,
such a link has been established by Halpern [14], in terms of probability structures
N = 〈W,V, px〉x∈A, where each px delivers a probability measure over an algebraA ⊆
P(W) and therefore satisfies px({w}) ≥ 0, for all w ∈ W , and ∑w∈W px({w}) = 1.4
Furthermore, let N some probability structure, andWϕ = {w ∈ W | 〈N,w〉 |= ϕ}.
Then, setting for any pointed probability structure Nˆ = 〈N, wˆ〉
Nˆ |= xϕ iff px(Wϕ) = 1, (†)
one may prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1 ([14]) KD45 is complete and sound w.r.t. the classN0 of all probability
structures.
(†) establishes a semantic connection between probability statements and expressions
of subjective certainty. The theorem then establishes KD45 as the appropriate logic
for reasoning about this probabilistic notion of subjective certainty. Note also that (†)
is equivalent to the following:
Nˆ |= xϕ iff 〈N,w′〉 |= ϕ, ∀w′ ∈ W s.t. px({w′}) > 0, (†’)
Proof Direction ‘⇒’: Assume px(Wϕ) = 1. By normalization, we have px(W) = 1, so
decomposingW into the disjoint subsetsWϕ andW \Wϕ , we have px(W \Wϕ) = 0.
Now decompose W \Wϕ into a disjoint union of singletons {w} ⊆ W \Wϕ . Then
by additivity,
∑
w∈W\Wϕ px({w}) = 0, so by positivity, px({w}) = 0 for each of these
singletons. Hence w ∈ W \Wϕ implies px({w}) = 0, which, by contraposition and the
definition ofWϕ , establishes the desired result.
Direction ‘⇐’: For arbitrary w′ ∈ W , px({w′}) > 0 implies 〈N,w′〉 |= ϕ, whence
by definition ofWϕ,w′ ∈ Wϕ . Hence for any w′′ ∈ W \Wϕ we have px({w′′}) = 0 by
modus tollens. SinceW \Wϕ is the disjoint union of these singletons andW the disjoint
union ofWϕ andW \Wϕ , we have 1 = px(W) = px(Wϕ) + px(W \Wϕ) = px(Wϕ). 
4 This restricts the px to countableW , which is fully sufficient for our case. Cf. [14, 314] for remarks
on generalizations to uncountable spaces.
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Moreover, given some probability structure N , let, for any x ∈ A, FNx = {w ∈
W |∃ϕ : 〈N,w〉 |= ¬ϕ ∧ xϕ} the set of x’s false beliefs. One can then immediately
also prove the following:
Theorem 2 ([14]) Given some x ∈ A,N ∈ N0. Then px(FNx ) = 0.
Proof Case FNx = ∅ is trivial. Otherwise, for arbitrary w ∈ FNx , there is some ϕ
which by (†) has px(Wϕ) = 1. However, by definition of FNx , 〈N,w〉 6|= ϕ and hence
{w} ⊆ W \ Wϕ . Then px({w}) ≤ px(W \ Wϕ) = 1 − px(Wϕ) = 0. Therefore, by
additivity, px(FNx ) =
∑
w∈FNx px({w}) = 0. 
The content of this theorem may be regarded as x being certain that her firm beliefs
are not false. Indeed, defining N1 ⊂ N0 to be the class of probability structures
that assign px({w}) > 0 over each px’s domain, one can show that S5 is sound and
complete w.r.t.N1 [14, 310]. In other words: adding that x is right in taking her beliefs
to be correct, one ends up with the standard logic of (idealized, internalist) knowledge.
However, probability assignments might vary not only from agent to agent but
also from world to world. Hence, consider also Halpern’s generalized probability
structuresN = 〈W,V, pwx 〉w∈W,x∈A, where for any pair 〈w, x〉 ∈ W × A, pwx delivers a
probability measure over an algebra A ⊆ P(W).
Moreover, let supp(px) =
{ 〈w,w′〉 ∈ W2 |pwx ({w′}) > 0}, and MN a Kripke
model defined (over A) in such a way that for every x ∈ A, Rx = supp(px). Given this
identification, we finally note the following theorem:
Theorem 3 ([14])Any extension ofK that includes eitherD orT is sound and complete
w.r.t. some class of probability structures.
4 Frauchiger-Renner reconsidered
Building on [23, 275–80], but with our refined inventory from Sect. 3, we can now
establish the following reconstruction of the Frauchiger-Renner theorem. First off, like
Nurgalieva and del Rio [23, 280], we assume all agents in A = {a, c, d, g} to share a
Kripke modelMFR = 〈W, R,V〉. This requires an extended language which includes
symbols for state assignments and measurement outcomes. The set P of elementary
propositions over which the model is defined then comprises all value claims of the
formM tx = y (short: ytx) considered in the FR-Protocol, as well as the state assignments
at given times in some run of the experiment.
To adequately represent the latter, we let |x〉ts stand for ‘s is in state |x〉 at t’.
This is an abuse of notation, as we now let the (indexed) ket-symbol refer to states
as well as proposition about states, depending on context. Moreover, to track the
(standard) usage of quantum state assignments in the proof as given above, we impose
the following condition:
∀t : |v(t)〉xy = |a〉x ⊗ |b〉y iff |a〉tx ∧ |b〉ty . (⊗/∧)
Note that on the left-hand side, the ket-symbol denotes states whereas on the right-
hand side, it denotes propositions.
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Since we model the FR-Protocol, the complex propositions at times t ∈ {1, . . . , 5}
therein must be assumed true in all w ∈ W . For further reference, we formalize these
as:5
ϕ0
∧
t∈[0,1) |init〉tr
∧
t∈[0,t1) |0〉ta
∧
t∈[0,t1] |0〉tl
∧
t∈[0,t2) |0〉tg
ϕ1 (0t1a ∨ 1t1a ) ∧ (0t1a ⊃ (‖0〉〉t1ar
∧
t∈(t1,t2] |0〉tl )) ∧ (1t1a ⊃ (‖1〉〉t1ar
∧
t∈(t1,t2] |+〉tl ))
ϕ2 (0t2g ∨ 1t2g ) ∧ (0t2g ⊃ ‖0〉〉t2gl ) ∧ (1t2g ⊃ ‖1〉〉t2gl )
ϕ3 (okt3c ∨ failt3c ) ∧ (okt3c ⊃
∧
t∈[t3,5] ‖ok〉〉tcra ) ∧ (failt3c ⊃
∧
t∈[t3,5] ‖fail〉〉tcra )
ϕ4 (okt4d ∨ failt4d ) ∧ (okt4d ⊃
∧
t∈[t4,5] ‖ok〉〉tdlg ) ∧ (fail
t4
d
⊃ ∧t∈[t4,5] ‖fail〉〉tdlg )
ϕ5 ((okt3c ⊃ |‖ok〉〉〉5dcra ) ∧ (fail
t3
c ⊃ |‖fail〉〉〉5dcra )) ∧ ((ok
t4
d
⊃ |‖ok〉〉〉5cdlg ) ∧ (fail
t4
d
⊃
|‖fail〉〉〉5cdlg ))
Here we have introduced some new notation, namely ‖y〉〉xs for a state of x that
unambiguously indicates that system s under study by xwas in state |y〉s . Themeaning
of |‖y〉〉〉xys should be obvious. Emphatically, we do not impose that this state of affairs
must have come about by a(n actual) measurement of sorts. x may convince herself
that |y〉ts by reasoning or communication.
Moreover, each x ∈ A must be capable of applying the appropriate unitaries in
order to determine the relevant Heisenberg operators in U. Hence that the unitaries
that model the evolution of the global sate are those of A 1 in the Appendix is another
assumption that should be considered part of theFR-Protocol. The restriction s , x inU
implies that Amanda cannot use these operators. For her, we letUa = (pi0⊗I+pi1⊗σx),
which is just the lg-part of Ut2 , postselected for M
t1
a = 1. We will refer to the
assumption that these are the ‘appropriate’ unitaries for the respective agents as υ
below.
Since ϕ0−5 ≡d f ∧5i=0 ϕi and υwill thereby hold in all worldsw′ ∈ W accessible by
any kind of (non-trivial) access relation Rx for an agent x ∈ A from any world w ∈ W ,
we immediately get thatMFR |= x(ϕ0−5 ∧ υ) for all x. Moreover, since the protocol
has been agreed upon by all agents, we assume that MFR |= yx(ϕ0−5 ∧ υ), for
arbitrary x, y. ϕ0−5 and υ, in other words, constitute the (common) common knowledge
of the modelMFR.
Let us now, given some modelM = 〈W, R,V〉, stipulate the following semantic
connection between quantum probabilities and the operatorsx, in order to recapture
the essence of Q and U: Given a pointed model Mˆ = 〈M, wˆ〉 with wˆ ∈ V(‖v〉〉t0xs ),
〈M, wˆ〉 |= xϕt iff s 〈v |pitϕ |v〉s = 1, (∗)
where ‖v〉〉xs unambiguously indicates that s’s state was |v〉s at t0, pitϕ is a Heisenberg
operator at t ≥ t0, and ϕt concerns some value measured at t, represented by pitϕ in
the quantum formalism.
It is easy to see that (∗) partitions W2 as follows: Given some model M =
〈W, R,V〉 over a set A of agents, Rx =
{〈w,w′〉 ∈ W2 |wRxw′}, and we let R¯x =
5 It would be tempting to introduce an action language [29, 112 ff.] in order to track the epistemic
dynamics involved. But this would complicate the formalism further while adding few insights. The same
holds for a first order predicate language, which would introduce the need to fix interpretations in semantic
proofs.
12 Florian J. Boge{〈w,w′〉 ∈ W2 |¬wRxw′} for each x ∈ A. SoW2 = Rx ∪ R¯x and Rx ∩ R¯x = ∅. Let also
Y = { 〈w,w′〉 ∈ W2 |∃t, y : 〈M,w〉 |= ‖y〉〉t0xs and 〈M,w′〉 |= ¬ytx}. ThenM satisfies
(∗) only if Y ⊆ R¯x and hence Rx ∩ Y = ∅, for all x ∈ A.
Clearly, there is a close connection between Halpern’s generalized probability
structures and (∗). However, (∗) constrains the reference world wˆ from which acces-
sibilities are evaluated in such a way that wˆ ∈ V(‖v〉〉t0xs ). We may read this condition
as stating that, relative to wˆ in which x assigns |v〉s to s, x gives measure 1 to the
subset of W in which ϕ is true. Moreover, given the equivalence between (†) and
(†’),6 another way of looking at this condition is that, whatever the global quan-
tum states |Ψ〉wˆ , |Ψ′〉w for wˆ and w, respectively, so long as |Ψ〉wˆ is of the form
|Ψ〉wˆ = . . . ⊗ ‖v〉〉xs ⊗ . . ., ϕ holds true in any world w such that |wˆ 〈Ψ|Ψ′〉w | is
non-zero.7
Remark 1 (Nested box-formulas) (∗) also allows nested assertions of the formxyϕ:
Assume that wˆ ∈ V(|‖v〉〉〉txxys ) at some arbitrary time tx, where |‖v〉〉〉txxys unambiguously
indicates that ‖v〉〉tyys , with y some agent, and this state in turn unambiguously indicates
|v〉s on some system s under study by y at ty. Then given that ys〈〈v | |pitxv ‖v〉〉ys = 1
(where pitxv = | |v〉〉〈〈v | |), if s 〈v |pitϕ |v〉s = 1 for t ≥ ty, xyϕt holds in wˆ. 
Upon imposing (∗), we can immediately see that S follows in T in the following
way:
Lemma 1 Given (∗), S is a theorem of T
Proof Suppose that s 〈v |pito |v〉s = 1. Then by (∗), a given pointed model Mˆ = 〈M, wˆ〉
that satisfies wˆ ∈ V(‖v〉〉t0xs ) for t0 ≤ t will also satisfy Mˆ |= xOt = o and vice
versa. Hence, S is equivalent to assuming Mˆ |= ¬(xOt = o ∧ x¬Ot = o) for any
such model. Using PC and the definition of ♦x, this is equivalent to Mˆ |= ¬xOt =
o ∨ ♦xOt = o, which in turn is equivalent to Mˆ |= xOt = o ⊃ ♦xOt = o. This
formula is true in reflexive models, as it is an instance of axiom D which follows from
T. (We can easily see this: assume that, for any ϕ, x, xϕ holds. From T, we then get
ϕ. Now assume also that ¬♦xϕ, which is equivalent to x¬ϕ. Using T again, we get
a contradiction (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ).) 
The above proof of S from (∗) would have been possible in a weaker axiom system
that includes D instead of T. However, recovering C within T as follows shows what
is really at stake:
Lemma 2 Given (∗), C is a theorem of T
Proof By (∗) and the above remark on nested box-formulas, proving C within T boils
down to proving Mˆ |= xyϕ ⊃ xϕ, for Mˆ = 〈M, wˆ〉 reflexive and wˆ ∈ V(|‖v〉〉〉txy ),
with |‖v〉〉〉xy and t as required. Hence, assume that Mˆ |= xyϕ for some such pointed
6 In addition, consider Thm. 5.1 in [14, 312].
7 Note, however, that this condition may never strictly apply: interactions between systems are basically
omnipresent, and they often entangle the systems involved. A global quantum state for a whole possible
world would hence be unlikely to have the required product-state form. The condition should rather be
considered in the asymptotic limit of free states for single systems.
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model. Then it holds that for any w s.t. wˆRxw, 〈M,w〉 |= yϕ. In turn this means
that for any w′ s.t. wRyw′ it holds that 〈M,w′〉 |= ϕ. However, by reflexivity of Ry,
〈M,w〉 |= ϕ. Since w is otherwise arbitrary, Mˆ |= xϕ. 
With (∗) in place, we could have also proven this syntactically by a sequential
application of the factivity axiom, T, and necessitation in the final step. Accordingly,
we have only used reflexivity in the proof, so we can see immediately that system T
suffices. This underscores Nurgalieva and del Rio’s [23, 278] observation that “[t]he
introspection axioms”, 4 and 5, “are not directly applied in the Frauchiger-Renner
setting[...].” But, they also think that they “resemble assumption S[...].” (ibid.) As we
have just seen, this coveys an unnecessarily strong status on S: it does not require an
invocation of symmetry or transitivity.
Still, in case an agent knows the outcome of some measurement, we may associate
a quantum state to her that indicates this unambiguously. This is weaker than (positive)
introspection (4), since it does not concern higher order knowledge. However, it may
give rise to further knowledge via condition (∗).
Now while T is usually considered ‘minimal’ as a meaningful epistemic logic, it
is nevertheless epistemic in the sense of establishing a factive notion of knowledge.
Hence, when Frauchiger and Renner talk about certainty and impose C, they really
must have knowledge in mind.
The Frauchiger-Renner theorem may now be restated as follows:8
Theorem 4 (FR; [10]) Given conditions (∗), U, as well as a reflexive Kripke model
MFR = 〈W, R,V〉 over A = {a, c, d, g} and with P containing all value statements and
state assignments in the FR-Protocol such that ϕ0−5 and υ are valid in all w ∈ W . Then
any wˆ ∈ W such that wˆ ∈ V(1t1a ) ∩V(1t2g ) ∩V(okt3c ) ∩V(okt4d ) satisfies
〈MFR, wˆ〉 |=⊥.
Proof Let MˆFR = 〈MFR, wˆ〉 and wˆ ∈ V(1t1a )∩V(1t2g )∩V(okt3c )∩V(okt4d ) as required.
(i) Based on wˆ ∈ V(1t1a ), we get MˆFR |= ‖1〉〉t1ar from MP on ϕ1. Consider the
operator pit11a = pi1. Since r 〈1|pi
t1
1a |1〉r = 1, we may infer from (∗) that MˆFR |= a1
t1
a .
Since any of the conjuncts from ϕ1 is valid in all w ∈ W , this, together with K,
establishes that MˆFR |= a |+〉t′l , for t ′ right after t1, when the preparation is finished.
Similarly, any of the conjuncts in ϕ0 holds in all w ∈ W , so that MˆFR |= a |0〉t′g .
Hence, in any w s.t. wˆRaw, it holds that
〈MFR,w〉 |= |+〉t′l ∧ |0〉t′g , which by (⊗/∧)
means that
〈MFR,w〉 |= |+〉t′l |0〉t′g , and therefore MˆFR |= a |+〉t′l |0〉t′g . Based on
this knowledge, we can assume a to be in a corresponding state ‖+, 0〉〉t′alg . By U and
υ, a can now appeal to Ua to obtain l 〈+| g〈0| pit4faild |+〉l |0〉g = 1, as is shown in the
Appendix, A 4, where pit4faild = U
†
a pifailUa . Therefore, by (∗), MˆFR |= afailt4d .
(ii) By assumption wˆ ∈ V(1t2g ). So by ϕ2, wˆ ∈ V(‖1〉〉t2gl ). Since l 〈1|pit2¬0l |1〉l = 1,
where pit2¬0l := I − pi0, (∗) now implies that MˆFR |= g¬ |0〉
t2
l
. It is easy to prove
that ϕ1 PC-implies ¬ |0〉t2l ⊃ 1t1a , and therefore, by MP, (g’s knowledge that) ϕ1,
8 Note that, like Nurgalieva and del Rio, we will allow some benign mixing of syntax and semantics in
abbreviating more or less obvious semantic proof sequences by invocations of the corresponding axioms.
We will generally also allow some amount of sloppiness when it comes to the exact involvement of
propositional logic.
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and K, MˆFR |= g1t1a . It similarly follows that MˆFR |= g‖1〉〉t1ar . Then in any
w ∈ W s.t. wˆRgw, 〈MFR,w〉 |= ‖1〉〉t1ar . As shown in (i), this suffices to establish that
〈MFR,w〉 |= a1t1a . Hence, MˆFR |= ga1t1a .
Assumenow thatMˆFR |= ♦g¬afailt4d . Then there is aw s.t. wˆRgw and 〈MFR,w〉 |=
¬afailt4d . However, MˆFR |= ga(ϕ0−5 ∧ υ) and, as we have just seen, MˆFR |=
ga1t1a . So for all w′ s.t. wˆRgw′, it holds that 〈MFR,w′〉 |= a1t1a ∧a(ϕ0−5 ∧ υ),
in particular also for w′ = w. However, as show in (i), this suffices to establish
〈MFR,w〉 |= afailt4d . Contradiction. Hence MˆFR |= gafailt4d , and Lm. 2 gives us
MˆFR |= gfailt4d .
(iii) From the fact that ‖init〉〉0cralg and ralg〈init| Π¬(okc∧0g) |init〉ralg = 1 (cf.Appendix,
A 1), with Π¬(okc∧0g) defined as in (4), we immediately get that MˆFR |= c(okt3c ⊃
¬0t2g ). By wˆ ∈ V(okt3c ) and ϕ3, we get wˆ ∈ V(‖ok〉〉t3cra ). ra 〈ok|pit3okc |ok〉ra = 1, where
pit3okc = piok, gives us MˆFR |= cok
t3
c . So by K, MˆFR |= c¬0t2g . In turn, PC, (c’s
knowledge that) ϕ2, and K establish that MˆFR |= c1t2g .
From (c’s knowledge of) ϕ2, and K, we immediately also get MˆFR |= c ‖1〉〉t2gl .
Thus, for any w ∈ W s.t. wˆRcw, it holds that w ∈ V(‖1〉〉t2gl ). Hence, as shown in (ii),
it follows that 〈MFR,w〉 |= g¬ |0〉t2l in any such w, and as is shown there as well,
〈MFR,w′〉 |= a1t1a for any w′ ∈ W s.t. wRgw′. So 〈MFR,w〉 |= ga1t1a . Since
w is otherwise arbitrary, we immediately get MˆFR |= cga1t1a . By Lm. 2, we can
reduce this to MˆFR |= ca1t1a , and the proof that MˆFR |= cfailt4d is immediate.
(iv) Finally, from the common common knowledge of ϕ0, we get that David will
not only be in state ‖init〉〉dralg at t = 0, but also in |‖init〉〉〉dxralg w.r.t. any x ∈ A. So by
the remark on nested box-formulas and (iii), we get that MˆFR |= dc(okt3c ⊃ ¬0t2g ).
Moreover, from ϕ5 we get that |‖ok〉〉〉5dcra , and so in basically the same way, we obtain
MˆFR |= dcokt3c . Thus, by K, in anyw s.t. wˆRdw, it holds that 〈MFR,w〉 |= c¬0t2g .
Hence MˆFR |= dc¬0t2g and by Lm. 2 MˆFR |= d¬0t2g . The proof that MˆFR |=
dfailt4d is now immediate.
However, wˆ ∈ V(okt4
d
) and so by ϕ4, wˆ ∈ V(‖ok〉〉t4dlg ). Considering that lg〈ok|pi
t4
¬faild |ok〉lg =
1, where pit4¬faild = I − pifail, we get MˆFR |= d¬fail
t4
d
. From Lm. 1, we get a contra-
diction. 
The proof of Thm. FR has the form of a reductio, leading from the assumption of
a world wˆ to a contradiction. Moreover, it is tempting to blame reflexivity, as it figured
crucially in the proof of Lm. 2, and we can easily provide a counterexample to Lm. 2
in an serial, transitive, Euclidean frame. Consider the model presented in Fig. 1: Every
agent ‘can see’ some world from any world (seriality), if two (not necessarily distinct)
worlds are seen by an agent from some world, they see each other (Euclideanness),
and worlds that can be seen from seen worlds are also seen (transitivity). Yet from
every world that x sees from w¬ϕ , y only sees worlds in which ϕ is true (xyϕ). But
in w¬ϕ , ϕ is false, and x can see this (♦x¬ϕ).
However, consider the following, stronger theorem:
Theorem 5 (FR*) Given conditions (∗), U, as well as a serial Kripke modelMFR =
〈W, R,V〉 over A = {a, c, d, g} and with P containing all value statements and state
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Fig. 1: Serial, transitive, Euclidean counterexample to Lm. 2.
assignments in the FR-Protocol, such that all w ∈ W satisfy ϕ0−5 and υ. Then there is
a wˆ ∈ W such that wˆ ∈ V(1t1a ) ∩ V(1t2g ) ∩ V(okt3c ) ∩ V(okt4d ) and 〈MFR, wˆ〉 |=⊥.
Proof (I) Let ϕFR ≡ 1t1a ∧1t2g ∧okt3c ∧okt4d . By the agreed upon ϕ0 and (⊗/∧), |init〉0ralg =
|init〉r
⊗
j=a,l,g |0〉 j . This is known by Chris and David, so ‖init〉〉0c/dralg holds in
any w ∈ W . Consider now the Heisenberg operator Π¬ϕFR = I4 − Πt4okΠt3okΠt21 Πt11 ,
defined in terms of projectors on Hralg and evolved under unitaries Ui from the
Appendix, A 1. As shown in the Appendix, A 2, ralg〈init|Π¬ϕFR |init〉ralg = 1 −
ralg〈init|Πt4okΠt3okΠt21 Πt11 |init〉ralg = 11/12 , 1. From (∗) it now follows thatMFR |=¬x¬ψFR for x ∈ {c, d}, who can avail themselves of the relevant unitaries on account
of υ. Hence, there is a wˆ ∈ W ∩V(1t1a ) ∩V(1t2g ) ∩V(okt3c ) ∩V(okt4d ), accessible to c, d
from any w ∈ W .
(II) As in step (i) of Thm. FR, we get wˆ ∈ V(‖+, 0〉〉t′alg ), and as shown in the
Appendix, A 4, l 〈+| g〈0| pit4¬okd |+〉l |0〉g = 1, where pi
t4
¬okd = U
†
a (I2 − piok)Ua . Then
MˆFR |= a¬okt4d . Assume now thatW = {wˆ}. Then the seriality of the accessibilities
collapses into reflexivity, and so MˆFR |= ¬okt4
d
. Contradiction. Hence, there must be
w , wˆ inW , s.t. wˆRaw and 〈MFR,w〉 |= ¬okt4d .
However, on account of ϕ4, we then get w ∈ V(failt4d ) and w ∈ V(‖fail〉〉t4dlg ). So
(∗) on lg〈fail|pit4¬okd |fail〉lg = 1 implies 〈MFR,w〉 |= d¬ok
t4
d
, where pit4¬okd = I − piok.
So 〈MFR,w′〉 |= ¬okt4
d
, for all w′ s.t. wRdw′. But according to (I), wRdwˆ. Hence,
MˆFR |= okt4
d
∧ ¬okt4
d
. 
The theorem is stronger since (I) proves the existence of wˆ and (II) shows that a
contradiction follows already in serial Kripke-models. Ad hoc, this rules out a retreat
to a doxastic interpretation of quantum probabilities as a quick fix.
5 Concerns and options
In conjunction, Thm.s FR andFR*might indeed be seen as establishing the inadequacy
of (epistemic/doxastic) modal logic in quantum settings. One might want to retreat to
setting Rx = ∅ for all x ∈ A, as there would then be a Kripke model in which none of
the two theorems follows. However, not only is K (in which this is possible) arguably
too weak for modelling either knowledge or certainty: An empty access relation is
incompatible with the non-vanishing probabilities implied by the FR-Protocol and
condition (∗). What options are on the table for avoiding Nurgalieva and del Rio’s
conclusion that modal logic itself is the culprit?
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One might react by assuming that quantum probabilities model something else
than knowledge or certainty, maybe propensities. But this move would fail, for then
probability-1 statements would model sure-fire propensities and a correct application
of QT would immediately give rise to knowledge of outcomes.
Moreover, note that quantum probabilities as degrees of belief are not confined
to positions such as QBism [12, 20, 13] or related ones [11, 15, 3]: several strategies
for recovering the Born rule in many worlds interpretations have them quantify some
kind of subjective uncertainty [e.g. 25, 28]. Similarly, known arguments for recovering
the statistical content of QT in Bohmian approaches require the assumption that
all particles in the universe be distributed according to the squared modulus of a
global wave function Ψ0 at some ‘initial time’. But Bohmian mechanics is perfectly
deterministic, so the assumption of such a ‘distribution’ amounts to “providing a
measure of subjective probability for the initial configuration” [7, 45]. Hence, if we
cannot interpret probability-1 assertions in QT either in terms of (or as giving rise to)
knowledge or subjective certainty, this is bad news indeed.
Another response might be that an experimental realization of the FR-Protocol is
inconceivable. For measurements involving human agents will typically not be of the
ideal von Neumann-type, but rather have a non-negligible effect on the initial state of
the measured object (human), i.e., proceed as |i〉x |0〉m 7→ αi f | f , i〉x |i〉m. However,
the proof does not strictly require non-disturbing measurements, as inferences to
pre-measurement states of agents and systems could still be drawn if the particular
influence of the act of measuring was known.
A more serious worry is that human agents are too complex to remain in coherent
states: repeated interactions with, say, air molecules and radiation will quickly deco-
here them into improper mixtures in a relevant basis.9 In fact, Wigner himself later
[31] stepped back from his views on consciousness when he encountered Zeh’s [33]
discovery of the decoherence mechanism.10
These are clearly valid concerns, but one must be careful not to judge the ex-
perimental realizability of quantum peculiarities too quickly: Schrödinger [27, 848],
for instance, suspected that a scenario of the EPR [8] kind might be experimentally
unrealisable; and today there is a flourishing field of Bell-type [1] experimentation.
Indeed, an experiment on the consequences of a related theorembyBrukner [4] has
recently been performed by Proietti et al. [24]. However, Proietti et al. [24, 3] “define
as observer any physical system that can extract information from another system by
means of some interaction, and store that information in a physical memory” and put
photons in the place of the two friends (Amanda and Gustavo) accordingly. Clearly,
such an experiment has no bearing whatsoever on the issues discussed in this paper,
as (neglecting panpsychism) photons are incapable of forming beliefs. Bottom line: at
present, it is perfectly unclear whether the protocol could in principle ever be realized,
but one should also not exclude this without a rigorous argument.
What about principles (∗),U, or even (⊗/∧)? (∗)was given a rather solid foundation
on the basis of Halpern’s work. However, in both proofs, we also proceeded from
9 Cf. [26] for an overview of decoherence theory.
10 Keep in mind, however, that decoherence by itself does not solve the measurement problem, as so
vividly pointed out by Bell [2].
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knowledge/certainty to a certain state of an agent, namely from a |+〉t′l |0〉t
′
g to
‖+, 0〉〉t′alg . One might worry about the intrusion of circularity at this point, but this
worry is easily dispersed: Condition (∗) only applies in situations where the relevant
state already pertains to the given agent and is otherwise silent. If we can, hence,
establish some claim to knowledge/certainty of the relevant form independently of
any direct quantum considerations, it seems perfectly sensible (almost undeniable) that
an agent should be in a state that unambiguously indicates a certain state assignment.
Similarly, denying (⊗/∧) is hardly feasible, for there does not seem to be anything
better than product states within the quantum formalism for stating that one system
is in one state and the other one in another. Note, moreover, that we have nowhere
required that it always be possible to assert such a conjunction, so (⊗/∧) is quite weak.
What about U? One way of denying U is Wigner’s originally favored option:
conscious cognitive agents are not just physical systems, so we cannot always model
them as evolving unitarily over time. This option introduces a serious mind-body
dualism, a position not very prominent in present in philosophy of mind, for various
convincing reasons.
However, one need not go down this exact road in rejecting U. QBists or like
interpreters of QT would, first off, certainly deny the adequacy of systems ‘being in
states |v〉s’, as quantum states are not seen as representational in such interpretations:
They need to be relativised to an assigner therein, and one would have to introduce
agent-dependent state assignments |v〉x,ts , meaning ‘x assigns |v〉 to s at t’.
This immediately obviates states of the form ‖v〉〉xy , but it does not block the two
theorems: Given that she assigns a corresponding state to lg at t ′, Amanda could still
evolve her Heisenberg operators unitarily and draw according inferences. Only if we
denied, as suggested by Wigner, that QT could be applied in this way to other agents
could we block the theorems. But with the representational function of quantum states
discarded, the dualism hence invoked would be merely epistemic: we need one set
of rules for reasoning about what we construe as ‘inanimate matter’ and another
set for what we construe as ‘others’. None of this points directly to a mind/ matter
divide in the ‘real world’, since our access to it is then remote, in part mediated by
(non-representational) quantum states.
There are also some tacit assumptions in both proofs, one being the establishment
of claims to knowledge/ certainty of states, not measurement results, on account of
condition (∗). This move may seem innocent, but it is actually an invocation of the
eigenvalue-eigenstate link [9], as it proceeds directly from probabilities evaluated on
Heisenberg operators to corresponding quantum states of systems. If this was denied,
there would be no possibility for Amanda to infer anything about the state of lg from
contemplated measurements in the first place, and hence both Thm. FR and FR*
would be blocked.
This brings us to another tacit assumption, namely that merely contemplated, i.e.,
counterfactualmeasurements can be treated on the same footing as actual ones. Indeed,
Healey [16, 1577–9] argues that the proof erroneously appeals to counterfactuals
that concern dependencies between measurement-outcomes at different times and
are maintained by an agent regardless of whether a measurement isolated from the
measurements producing these outcomes was performed in between.
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In particular, Healey [16, 1586–8] targets a counterfactual leading from a’s mea-
surement 1t1a to fail
t4
d
, which is maintained even though c measures ra between the two
events. Interestingly, the reason why Healey objects to this counterfactual is basically
an acknowledgement of the stipulation s , x in condition U:
[a] is justified in using the state assignment [|+〉t′l ] for the purpose of predicting
the outcome of a measurement on [l] only where [l]’s correlations with other
systems (encoded in an entangled state of a supersystem) may be neglected.
[16, 1588]
Hence, the fact that Chris and David can model Amanda herself as entangled with
l undercuts all inferences by Amanda involving the Heisenberg operators pit4faild, pi
t4
¬okd
in Thm.s FR and FR*.
This provides another, independent reason to be suspicious of U, as Healey’s
arguments do not concern questions of consciousness but only correlations that will
be neglected if the locally established state (|+〉t′l ) is taken to have general validity.
Incidentally, a similar kind of argument could be made by a many worlds-theorist:
The unitaryUa has no meaning in a many worlds-view, as Amanda should model her
own evolution qua physical system by a unitary that affects her own state, and only
this will provide the correct correlations that she, qua conscious being, will encounter
after branching. Similarly, Bohmians could argue that Amanda would compute the
wrong correlations between particles forming her brain and other systems if she used
the local unitary Ua . Hence, U, as stated here and used by Frauchiger and Renner
seems objectionable on several grounds.
6 Conclusions
This paper offered a thorough analysis of the theorem by Frauchiger and Renner
within epistemic system T and provided an additional theorem compatible with a
doxastic reading of quantum probability-1. Together, these theorems (FR, FR*) come
dangerously close to justifying Nurgalieva and del Rio’s assessment that modal logic
might be inadequate for reasoning about credences or knowledge in quantum settings.
The subsequent discussion has shown, though, that there are several reasons for
rejecting condition U, tacitly applied by Frauchiger and Renner and made explicit
by Nurgalieva and del Rio and here: Many worlds-theorists, Bohmians, as well as
Healeyan pragmatists should have reservations about the stipulation s , x (more
frankly: the isometries used by Frauchiger and Renner).
Finally, the absence of iterated certainties of different agents in Thm. FR* defies
Brukner’s [4, 8–9] assessment that:
the theorem by Frauchiger and Renner [...] points to the necessity to differ-
entiate between ones’ knowledge about direct observations and ones’ knowl-
edge about others’ knowledge that is compatible with physical theories. It is
likely that understanding this difference will be an important ingredient in
further development of the method of Bayesian inference in situations as in
the Wigner-friend experiment.
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However, as we have seen, QBist or like interpreters of QT could deny the appli-
cability of quantum states and unitary QT to other epistemic agents in the first place,
without buying into Wignerian mind-body dualism. This would block Amanda’s in-
ferences in both theorems, and Brukner’s remark could be maintained with a slight
modification: The two theorems point to the necessity to differentiate between ‘states
of matter’ and ‘mental states of other agents’, as conceived from the point of view of
the agent using QT to make headway in her experienced environment.
Appendix
A 1 We show that ralg〈init| Π¬(okc∧0g) |init〉ralg = 1−0 = 1. For simplicity, we suppress
system-indices where convenient and stick to the order ralg for tensored quantum
states.
For reference, we note the unitaries that effect the state-transitions within steps 1
and 2 as given on the joint Hilbert spaceHralg:
Ut1 =pi0 ⊗ I3 + pi1 ⊗ σx ⊗ I2,
Ut′ =pi0 ⊗ I3 + pi1 ⊗ I ⊗
√
1/2 (σx + σz) ⊗ I,
Ut2 =pi0 ⊗ I3 + pi1 ⊗ I ⊗ (pi0 ⊗ I + pi1 ⊗ σx).
Here, σx = |0〉〈1| + |1〉〈0| and σz = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|.11 In the Schrödinger picture,
Ut1 models the coupling of r and a in |init〉ralg upon Amanda’s first measurement,Ut′
models that both couple to l in Amanda’s preparation immediately after that, and Ut2
g’s coupling with l in his subsequent measurement. The reader may verify herself that
these give the correct states and are, in fact, all not just unitary (U†i Ui = UiU
†
i = I)
but also self-adjoint (U†i = Ui). Note that we generally consider the evolution of local
projectors extended to a larger space (pi 7→ Π := I ⊗ . . . ⊗ I ⊗ pi ⊗ I ⊗ . . .).
From (4) it is straightforward to see that Πt3okΠ
t2
0 reduces to U¯
†(piok ⊗ I2)Ut2 (I2 ⊗
pi0 ⊗ I)U. Hence
ralg〈init| Πt3okΠt20 |init〉ralg =
=ralg〈Ψ| (piok ⊗ I2)Ut2 (I2 ⊗ pi0 ⊗ I)(
√
1/3 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 +
√
1/3 |1〉 |1〉 |0〉 |0〉 +
√
1/3 |1〉 |1〉 |1〉 |0〉)
=ralg〈Ψ| (piok ⊗ I2)Ut2 (
√
1/3 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 +
√
1/3 |1〉 |1〉 |0〉 |0〉)
=ralg〈Ψ| (piok ⊗ I2)(
√
1/3 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 +
√
1/3 |1〉 |1〉 |0〉 |0〉)
Since
piok = |ok〉〈ok| = (1/2)( |0〉〈0|⊗ |0〉〈0|− |0〉〈1|⊗ |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈1|⊗ |1〉〈1|− |1〉〈0|⊗ |1〉〈0|),
it is easy to verify that the state to the right is an eigenvector of piok⊗ I2 with eigenvalue
zero, so we immediately get
ralg〈init| Πt3okΠt20 |init〉ralg = 0.

11 Recall also from the introduction that I acts on a single-system Hilbert space, I2 = I ⊗ I, I3 = I2 ⊗ I,
etc.
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A 2 We show that 1 − ralg〈init|Πt4okΠt3okΠt21 Πt11 |init〉ralg = 1. Until a’s measurement is
completed at t1, the joint state of r and a’s memory will evolve trivially, whence
Πt11 := I4(pi1 ⊗ I3)I4 = pi1 ⊗ I3.
After that, the global state |init〉ralg will evolve under Ut1 and Ut′ in the Schrödinger
picture, as described in A 1. Accordingly,
Πt21 := Ut1Ut′(I2 ⊗ pi1 ⊗ I)Ut′Ut1
As for Πt3ok and Π
t4
ok, each of these needs to be evolved by all unitaries Ui ,
whereafter the evolution is again considered trivial on all spaces. Since the term
Ut2Ut′Ut1Ut1Ut′Ut2 in the middle of Π
t4
okΠ
t3
ok gives the identity and the untransformed
projectors will be of the form I2 ⊗ piok, piok ⊗ I2, we only need to consider
Ut1Ut′Ut2piok ⊗ piokUt2Ut′Ut1 .
Now we can let Ut1Ut′Ut2 act on ralg〈init| to obtain ralg〈Ψ|, as in eqs. (2) and (3).
Moreover, we find that Ut′Ut1Ut1Ut′ = I4 in between Π
t4
okΠ
t3
ok and Π
t2
1 Π
t1
1 . Therefore,
we need to evaluate
ralg〈Ψ| (piok ⊗ piok)Ut2 (I2 ⊗ pi1 ⊗ I)Ut′Ut1 (pi1 ⊗ I3) |init〉ralg =
=
√
1/12 〈ok| 〈ok|Ut2 (I2 ⊗ pi1 ⊗ I)Ut′Ut1 (pi1 ⊗ I3) |init〉ralg =
=
√
1/24 〈ok| 〈ok|Ut2 (I2 ⊗ pi1 ⊗ I)(pi0 ⊗ I3 + pi1 ⊗ σx ⊗ (σx + σz) ⊗ I)(pi1 ⊗ I3) |init〉ralg =
=
√
1/24 〈ok| 〈ok|Ut2 (pi1 ⊗ σx ⊗ pi1 (σx + σz) ⊗ I) |init〉ralg =
=
√
1/24 〈ok| 〈ok|Ut2 (pi1 ⊗ σx ⊗ ( |1〉〈0| − pi1) ⊗ I |init〉ralg =
=
√
1/24 〈ok| 〈ok| pi1 ⊗ σx ⊗ (pi0 ⊗ I + pi1 ⊗ σx)( |1〉〈0| ⊗ I − pi1 ⊗ I) |init〉ralg
=
√
1/24 〈ok| 〈ok| pi1 ⊗ σx ⊗ ( |1〉〈0| − pi1) ⊗ σx) |init〉ralg .
Consider the two operators A = pi1 ⊗ σx ⊗ |1〉〈0| ⊗ σx and B = −pi1 ⊗ σx ⊗ pi1 ⊗
σx on |init〉ralg =
√
1/3 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 + √2/3 |1〉 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 individually. Due to
pi1’s appearance in places other than the first, |init〉ralg is an eigenvector of B with
eigenvalue 0. A eliminates the first term but flips all 0s in the second term of |init〉ralg
to 1s. Hence we get
ralg〈Ψ| (piok ⊗ piok)Ut2 (I2 ⊗ pi1 ⊗ I)Ut′Ut1 (pi1 ⊗ I3) |init〉ralg =
=(1/6)( 〈ok| 〈ok|)( |1〉 |1〉 |1〉 |1〉) = 1/12.
Note that this implies Pr
(
okt3c ∧ okt4d |1t1a ∧ 1t2g
)
= 1. 
A 3 We show that ralg〈init| Π¬(1g∧0a ) |init〉ralg = 1. To do so, we only need to show
that ralg〈init| Πt21 Πt10 |init〉ralg = 0, where
Πt10 := pi0 ⊗ I3,
and Πt21 is defined as in A 2.
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Inserting these, we get
ralg〈init| Πt21 Πt10 |init〉ralg = ralg〈init|Ut1Ut′(I2 ⊗ pi1 ⊗ I)Ut′Ut1 (pi0 ⊗ I3) |init〉ralg .
It is easy to check thatUt1Ut′ = Ut′Ut1 = (pi0 ⊗ I3 +pi1 ⊗σx ⊗ (σx + σz) ⊗ I). Inserting
this, we get
ralg〈init| Πt21 Πt10 |init〉ralg =
=ralg〈init| (pi0 ⊗ I ⊗ pi1 ⊗ I + pi1 ⊗ σx ⊗ ( |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈1|) ⊗ I)(pi0 ⊗ I3) |init〉ralg /2 =
=ralg〈init| pi0 ⊗ I ⊗ pi1 ⊗ I |init〉ralg /2.
Now |init〉ralg =
√
1/3 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉+√2/3 |1〉 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉), so |init〉ralg is an eigen-
vector of this operator with eigenvalue zero. 
A 4 We show that l 〈+| g〈0| pit4fail |+〉l |0〉g = l 〈+| g〈0| pit4¬ok |+〉l |0〉g = 1, where pit4fail =
U†a pifailUa , pi
t4
¬ok = U
†
a (I2 − piok)Ua , and we recall that Ua = pi0 ⊗ I + pi1 ⊗ σx is the
lg-part of Ut2 , postselected for 1
t1
a . Using the Schrödinger picture, it is easy to verify
that
Ua |+〉l |0〉g = |fail〉lg ,
so it is immediate that
l 〈+| g〈0| pit4fail |+〉l |0〉g = lg〈fail| pifail |fail〉lg = 1. (6)
Moreover,
〈ok|fail〉 = ( 〈0| 〈0| − 〈1| 〈1|)( |0〉 |0〉 + |1〉 |1〉)/2 = (1 − 1)/2 = 0,
which establishes
l 〈+| g〈0| pit4¬ok |+〉l |0〉g = 1 − lg〈fail| piok |fail〉lg = 1 − 0 = 1.

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